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Is Ukraine turning away from Europe? 
Marius Vahl
* 
 
Ukraine is tired of waiting. No one, not even a petty bureaucrat, has said they want Ukraine in the EU. 
And I say to those who are in a hurry, if they asked me to join the EU today I would refuse. 
Leonid Kuchma, 30 September 2003 
 
s Ukraine prepares for presidential 
elections on 31 October, the sentiments 
expressed by President Leonid Kuchma 
last autumn seem to be widely shared by 
Ukraine’s political elite. The unwillingness of the 
EU to acknowledge Ukraine as a potential 
member of the Union is often interpreted as the 
result of anti-Ukrainian feelings in the EU and 
dominates any discussion on the EU’s new 
European Neighbourhood Policy, in which 
Ukraine is one of the principal partners.  
Complaints about the absence of an EU 
membership prospect have been a prominent 
feature of the foreign policy debate in Ukraine 
ever since EU membership was declared a 
strategic goal of Ukrainian foreign policy in 
1998. In the past, however, such statements were 
not followed by any significant changes in 
Ukrainian foreign policy. By contrast, such 
criticisms are now accompanied by measures 
that may appear to signal a change in Ukrainian 
foreign policy, distancing itself from its avowed 
‘European choice’ and moving towards closer 
relations with Russia and the other countries in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): 
•  In May, Ukraine and its three CIS partners 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed to 
move forward towards creating a ‘common’ or 
‘single’ economic space, in spite of warnings 
from the EU that this could endanger 
Ukraine’s European aspirations.  
•  May also saw the privatisation of 
Kryvorizhstal, one of Ukraine’s largest steel 
plants. The process was construed in such a way 
as to favour domestic investors with close links 
to the government, foregoing better offers from 
foreign investors. The process was widely 
criticised, both inside Ukraine and abroad. 
* Marius Vahl is Research Fellow at CEPS. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable 
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•  In June, Ukraine rejected the draft Action Plan, the 
principal instrument of the EU’s European 
Neighbourhood Policy, aimed at strengthening relations 
between the EU and its neighbours.  
•  In July, the Ukrainian government made last minute 
changes to its new military doctrine, removing the 
sentences stating that membership of the EU and NATO 
was the ultimate goal of Ukrainian policy, leaving a 
much vaguer formulation of aiming at ‘Euro-Atlantic 
integration’.  
•  In August, the Ukrainian government decided to go 
ahead with the construction of a controversial canal on 
the Danube delta, in spite of protests from its neighbour 
(and future EU member) Romania and the European 
Commission.  
•  In September, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich stated 
that Ukraine had been “humiliated” by the EU’s 
unwillingness to acknowledge its membership 
aspirations and that it would no longer seek an early 
promise of membership prospects from the EU, but 
would focus on limited short-term agreements. 
Although this seems to indicate a shift in Ukrainian policy, 
other interpretations of these developments are also 
possible. One is to see the recent decisions as tactical 
moves aimed at a domestic audience, as part of the 
presidential election campaign. Another interpretation 
would be to see this as the end of Ukrainian illusions about 
the EU and Ukraine’s prospects for rapid integration and 
the beginning of a more realistic approach to European 
integration. The objective of this paper is to assess these 
three alternative explanations of recent developments in 
Ukraine and its foreign policy. 
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Is Ukraine turning to the East? 
It is often asserted that as a result of the ‘rejection’ by 
Europe and the EU, Ukraine should instead seek 
cooperation and integration with Russia and its partners in 
the CIS.  
Ukraine has recently entered into a number of agreements 
with Russia, some of which run counter either to the EU’s 
expressed interests or Ukraine’s officially stated ‘European 
choice’ or both. In July 2004, the Ukrainian government 
agreed to allow Russian oil through the Odessa-Brody 
pipeline into the Black Sea, a decision that was criticised by 
the EU. The pipeline was initially intended to be used for 
oil transport in the opposite direction, bringing Caspian oil 
to European markets and avoiding the congested Bosporus 
straits. The latter is of growing importance to the EU in 
light of Turkey’s progress towards EU-accession 
negotiations. In May, the Ukrainian and Russian foreign 
ministers agreed to coordinate policy towards the EU, 
regardless of the fact that the two countries have widely 
diverging long-term goals for relations with the EU. 
Whereas Ukraine seeks an association agreement with the 
EU in the medium-term as a staging post towards the 
ultimate goal of full membership, Russia is seeking neither 
association nor EU membership.  
The extent of Russian-Ukrainian rapprochement should not, 
however, be exaggerated. There have also been disputes 
between Ukraine and Russia, notably the Tuzla island 
incident at the beginning of 2004, related to disagreements 
over the exact location of the frontier between Russia and 
Ukraine in the Sea of Azov, on which there is no 
agreement.  
The most widely cited example of an Eastern turn in 
Ukrainian foreign policy was the decision to join three CIS 
partners in creating a Single Economic Space (SES) in 
September 2003. The SES is envisaged as an economic 
union to be developed in stages, with a free trade area 
followed by a customs union, leading in the end to full 
economic union. At an SES summit in May 2004, the four 
presidents initiated the drafting process of a number of 
agreements on the creation of an SES, and more than two 
dozen agreements were endorsed at a summit in September 
2004. The agreements, including those on the simplification 
of travel procedures and the introduction of harmonised 
VAT rates, are to be signed in 2005, with work on creating 
a free trade area to be undertaken from the middle of 2005. 
The Commission warned Ukrainian leaders as early as 
September 2003 that implementation of the later stages of 
the planned SES could endanger further integration with 
the EU.  
The SES is not the first ambitious, multilateral economic-
integration project in the former Soviet Union. Previous 
agreements on a CIS Customs Union and more recently a 
Eurasian Economic Community, as well as a host of 
bilateral agreements among CIS members, have not been 
implemented. Many observers expect the same to happen 
with the SES. The widely diverging statements made by the 
four leaders in Yalta seem to provide support for the 
sceptics. President Vladimir Putin called for the creation of 
the “legal foundations” of the SES, and predicted that by 
2005-06, there would be agreements that include “pursuing 
a common foreign trade policy, setting common customs 
tariffs, forming a unified competitive environment and 
creating a single regulatory body”. President Kuchma said 
that the “creation of the large-scale free trade zone without 
reserves and restrictions is the primary task on the path to 
forming the Single Economic Space”. Yet in September 
2003 Ukraine had already indicated its reservations 
concerning the later stages of the SES, notably on an 
eventual customs union, by stressing that its participation in 
the SES should not conflict with its ambitions for WTO and 
eventually EU membership. The President of Kazakhstan, 
Nursultan Nazarbaev, stated that the next step would have 
to be the creation of a customs union, “otherwise I don’t 
understand what we are going to do next”. By contrast 
President Alexander Lukashenko appears rather indifferent 
about the SES, noting that Belarus is already more 
integrated with Russia through the Union of Belarus and 
Russia (UBR), and that the SES will have limited impact on 
Belarus. 
Whether the latest CIS integration initiative will be 
implemented remains to be seen. Ukraine has been a 
reluctant member of the CIS from the beginning, and has 
not previously participated in CIS integration schemes. 
Indeed, in the late 1990s Ukraine was the instigator of the 
now largely defunct group known as GUUAM (consisting 
of Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova in 
addition to Ukraine), frequently seen as a potential rival to 
the Russian-dominated CIS. Although the symbolic 
political significance of the Ukrainian decision to be part of 
the SES should not be ignored, the reservations to 
participate fully are equally notable, and may indeed 
become an important obstacle to the development of the 
SES. 
Opinion polls seem to support the impression of a modest, 
rather than a major shift in Ukraine’s foreign policy 
orientation. In 2001, EU membership received almost twice 
as much support as membership in the UBR. Two years 
later, support for the EU had fallen by a third, while support 
for the Eastern vector had grown, making the two 
alternatives approximately equally attractive to the 
Ukrainian public (see Table 1). Nevertheless, support for 
EU membership remains high. Some 55% were in favour of 
EU membership and only 18% were against it in a survey 
conducted in May 2003.
1 Ukraine’s inclusion in the Union 
of Belarus and Russia receives stronger support than the 
EU, with 69% of respondents in favour and 19% against. 
Yet support for the Western and Eastern vectors is 
remarkably similar if those who answered ‘don’t know’ are 
omitted, with 75% in support of EU membership and 78% 
in favour of joining the Union of Belarus and Russia. 
                                                 
1 See Joanna Konieczna (2004), Europa outside EU: Meet 
your new neighbour, Ukraine, Institute of Sociology, 
University of Warsaw, 26 April.  IS UKRAINE TURNING AWAY FROM EUROPE? | 3 
 
Table 1. Public opinion on foreign policy orientation of 
Ukraine 
  Western vector  Multi-vector  Eastern vector 
2001 32  51  17 
2003 22  55  23 
Source: J. Koniecznal (2004), op. cit. 
Notes: Western vector – yes to EU, no to UBR; multi-vector – yes to 
EU, yes to UBR; Eastern vector – no to EU, yes to UBR. 
Those who were ‘uncertain’ (32% in 2001 and 33% in 2003) 
and those against both (5% in 2001 and 2% in 2003) have 
been omitted from these figures. 
Just part of the presidential election campaign? 
Many of the Ukrainian observers who are sceptical about 
the SES regard Ukraine’s decision to participate merely as 
part of the presidential election campaign, rather than a 
serious shift in Ukrainian foreign policy. The first round of 
voting will take place on 31 October. It is expected that a 
second round of voting will be required, pitting the current 
Prime Minister Yanukovich against opposition leader and 
former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko. While the latter 
leads in the opinion polls, the prime minister, with the help 
of the machinery of the administration, has been gaining 
ground in recent months. According to a recent poll, Mr 
Yuschenko would receive 38% in a second round, and Mr 
Yanukovich 34%. A large number of voters (28%), 
however, are undecided and the race for the Ukrainian 
presidency remains open.  
The election campaign has been dominated by the conduct 
of the campaign itself, notably the attempted poisoning of 
Mr Yuschenko, rather than policy issues. Nevertheless, 
integration with Russia and/or with Europe and the West 
has become an important underlying theme in the debate 
between the two principal contenders. The recent shifts in 
Ukrainian policy by the government are interpreted as 
aimed at gathering support for the pro-government 
candidate Mr Yanukovich from the mainly Russian-
speaking population in Eastern Ukraine, where a foreign 
policy that is principally oriented towards cooperation and 
integration with Russia has considerable public support (see 
Table 2). The Russian decision to scrap VAT on energy 
exports to Ukraine as a first initiative of the SES, 
representing $800 million in lost revenue for Russia and a 
subsequent gain for Ukrainian importers, is seen as a way 
for the pro-government candidate to be supported by voters 
in Eastern Ukraine and for Russia to achieve a more 
Russian-friendly government.  
Table 2. Regional differences on Ukrainian foreign policy 
orientations 
  Western vector  Multi-vector  Eastern vector 
West  61  31    8 
Central 19 60  21 
South & East    9  59  32 
Source: J. Konieczna (2004), op. cit. 
Note: Those who responded as ‘uncertain’ have been omitted from 
these figures. 
Assessments of the significance of the upcoming elections 
diverge widely. At one end of the spectrum are those who 
see few prospects for any significant change in Ukrainian 
foreign or domestic policies, regardless of the outcome of 
the elections. According to this analysis, the current 
political and economic system is too entrenched to allow 
any fundamental change during the next presidency. At the 
opposite end are those who regard the elections as a turning 
point in Ukrainian history. In this second analysis, Ukraine 
is faced with a stark choice: to either turn towards a 
prosperous European democracy with Mr Yuschenko or 
towards an authoritarian, pro-Russian regime under Mr 
Yanukovich. While the differences between the two 
candidates in terms of both foreign and domestic policies 
are indeed significant, there are a number of reasons why 
these differences are unlikely to be as great in eventual 
Ukrainian policy as predicted by many analysts.  
In the case of a Yuschenko victory, the new president could 
be expected to start his period in office with a number of 
spectacular changes, such as announcing Ukraine’s 
withdrawal from the planned SES as well as initiating a 
pro-reform agenda. But he is likely to face stiff opposition 
from the entrenched elites – among the oligarchs and 
regional elites along with the administration apparatus – if, 
as expected, he attempts to undertake genuine economic 
and political reforms. A protracted political battle would 
likely ensue and it is uncertain whether control over the 
executive branch in Kyiv is sufficient for Mr Yuschenko to 
prevail. The parliament now appears as less of an obstacle 
to a President Yuschenko following the recent defections 
from the pro-presidential group in parliament in early 
September, which previously were in majority and were 
expected to support Mr Yanukovich. This also entails that 
the amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution proposed by 
President Kuchma, which would reduce the power of the 
presidency in favour of the prime minister, are unlikely to 
pass. 
The conduct of the government during the election 
campaign, with widespread discrimination in the media and 
attempts at applying ‘administrative pressure’ to ensure 
victory for Mr Yanukovich, falls far short of European 
democratic standards. But it seems unlikely that a 
Yanukovich presidency would take the country far down a 
more authoritarian path, similar to developments in most 
former Soviet republics.  
First, while aspects of the political reform agenda (or lack 
thereof) of the current administration are a cause for serious 
concern, the verdict on the economic policies of the current 
administration is more mixed. Its policies on corporate 
governance, with the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal as the 
most blatant example, leaves much to be desired from a 
European perspective, as does the pre-election decision to 
double pensions and student grants. Nevertheless, the sound 
macroeconomic policies introduced while Mr Yuschenko 
was prime minister (1999-2001) have been maintained and 
have made an important contribution to the improved 
economy of Ukraine, which currently enjoys double-digit 
growth rates.  4 | Marius Vahl 
 
Second, the identification of Mr Yanukovich with President 
Kuchma and his supporters should also be qualified. His 
appointment as prime minister was primarily because of his 
close connection with powerful groups in the Donetsk 
region in Eastern Ukraine and the fact that he was not part 
of the pro-Kuchma camp, nor was he the preferred 
presidential candidate of President Kuchma and his 
supporters.  
Third, and in spite of the changes to the military doctrine, it 
should be noted that the current government continues its 
commitment to further Euro-Atlantic integration. While Mr 
Yanukovich is also committed to the SES, as long as or 
until integration in the CIS moves beyond political rhetoric 
and summits become more than photo opportunities for 
their leaders, cooperation with its CIS partners will not 
constitute an obstacle to Ukraine’s integration with the EU. 
Given the record of CIS integration, this seems unlikely to 
happen.   
Crucially, even if the pro-government forces wanted to turn 
Ukraine towards a more authoritarian direction, it is 
unlikely that they would be able to prevail. Ukraine is both 
politically and economically far more pluralistic than most 
former Soviet republics (with Moldova as perhaps the only 
exception), and it is unlikely that a Yanukovich government 
would be able to increase an authoritarian influence. The 
widely condemned and largely unsuccessful attempts to 
curb the freedom of the media by the presidential 
administration provide one example of the pluralism of 
Ukraine. A Yanukovich victory, however, would enable the 
current regime – which has been in power for a decade – 
and those who benefit from it to more deeply entrench their 
positions, making further reforms gradually more difficult.  
From EUphoria to pragmatism? 
A third explanation of the apparent shift in Ukrainian 
foreign policy favoured by more optimistic pro-European 
forces is to view the current disillusionment as the end of 
the ‘romantic’ period of Ukraine’s European choice and the 
beginning of a more pragmatic and realistic approach 
towards European integration. This is seen in the growing 
realisation that achieving EU membership – the main long-
term foreign policy objective of Ukraine – is principally a 
matter of domestic policy, exemplified by the increasingly 
widespread use of the phrase ‘Europeanisation starts at 
home’.  
This realisation is not limited to the opposition, as indicated 
by Prime Minister Yanukovich’s recent statements that 
Ukraine would not be seeking any early promise of 
membership prospects from the EU. In this context it 
should also be noted that the changes in Ukraine’s military 
doctrine were made just after President Kuchma returned 
from the EU-Ukraine summits in early June and the 
NATO-Ukraine summit in late July. Indeed, the gist of this 
argument has been made by none other than Ukrainian 
president himself, which he began by stating, “Let’s stop 
talking about becoming an EU member, let’s just put before 
us the aim of reaching European standards”. 
That notwithstanding, geopolitical perspectives largely 
detached from the realities of European integration remain 
prominent in the discourse on Ukraine’s European policy. 
Foreign policy debates typically focus on Ukraine’s geo-
strategically important position and the need for Ukraine to 
balance (or alternatively be a bridge) between two great 
powers, the EU and Russia, as indeed this policy brief is an 
example. This is also apparent in the striking lack of 
interest in discussing concrete policy proposals, such as 
those of the recent Commission strategy paper on the EU’s 
European Neighbourhood Policy.  
What does this mean for Europe? 
The question posed in the title of this policy brief – is 
Ukraine turning away from Europe – is potentially 
misleading, as it implies that Ukraine has at some stage 
turned towards Europe. While true in rhetoric since the late 
1990s, it is not the case either in terms of the actual conduct 
of Ukrainian foreign policy or the development of domestic 
reforms in the last few years. The recent actions of the 
Ukrainian government should be interpreted in this light, as 
a relatively minor recalibration of Ukraine’s multi-vectoral 
foreign policy. Such a multi-vectoral orientation received 
by far the greatest public support in Ukraine in 2003, more 
than the Western and the Eastern alternatives combined. 
Given the great differences in public opinion in Western 
and Eastern Ukraine, a multi-vectoral foreign policy also 
makes electoral sense.  
As far as the elections are concerned, the most extreme 
scenarios appear unlikely, be it a fundamental shift towards 
full Europeanisation under a President Yuschenko or an the 
emergence of an authoritarian, pro-Russian Ukraine under 
President Yanukovich. The benefactors of the Kuchma 
decade are deeply entrenched in the power structures of 
Ukraine, and are likely to constitute a considerable obstacle 
for reforms under Mr Yuschenko. For precisely this reason, 
a Yanokovich regime would, however, have less interest in 
vigorously pursuing reforms. But Ukraine has probably 
moved too far down the path of reform and is too open and 
pluralistic to allow a fundamental reversal towards an 
authoritarian regime as happened in Belarus under 
President Lukashenko and, to a lesser extent, in Russia 
under President Putin. Regardless of the outcome of the 
elections, finalising the economic and political transition 
process in Ukraine will take a long time, which it 
increasingly realises. Recent statements by Ukrainian 
leaders may indicate that the EU’s message that it is 
unwilling to discuss membership for the foreseeable future 
has finally been acknowledged, if not accepted, and that 
one could expect a new realism in Ukraine’s approach to 
the EU. The presidential contest is thus more about the 
speed and scope of reforms than the basic direction in 
which Ukraine will move over the next few years. 
The apparent change in Ukraine’s European policy towards 
a more pragmatic approach may appear to facilitate the 
dialogue between the EU and Ukraine, at least in the short 
term. It is, however, unlikely that the question of IS UKRAINE TURNING AWAY FROM EUROPE? | 5 
 
membership will disappear from the bilateral agenda, 
regardless of who wins the presidential elections. 
Furthermore, it needs to be recognised that the perceived 
lack of EU support is making reforms more difficult. The 
EU and Ukraine could easily find themselves in a vicious 
circle, as the subsequent lack of reform in Ukraine will ease 
the pressure on the EU to provide any EU-accession 
prospects for Ukraine, whose lukewarm attitudes make 
reform in Ukraine even more difficult, etc. While the 
pluralism of Ukraine is likely to prevent a shift towards 
authoritarianism, modern democratic Ukraine is fragile and 
susceptible to long-term erosion. Such a development 
within one of its most important neighbours is not in the 
interest of the EU.   
Regardless of the merits of Ukrainian criticisms of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, its reception in Ukraine 
indicates that the EU has already missed one opportunity to 
foster the reforms in Ukraine that the EU ultimately seeks.  
The EU now needs to ensure that it sends the appropriate 
signals concerning the conduct of the elections. If the 
elections are not free and fair and the government uses the 
administration machinery inappropriately to guarantee the 
victory of Mr Yanukovich, this should have clear and 
immediate consequences for relations between the new 
Ukrainian president and the EU. This result should not lead 
to a reduction in support for the country as such, but a shift 
in support away from the regime towards civil society, to 
ensure that Ukraine remains pluralistic. If on the other hand 
the elections are free and are followed by steps towards 
pro-European reform, the EU should reciprocate, above all 
by making sure that the Action Plan moves the bilateral 
relationship significantly and noticeably beyond the current 
state of affairs.  
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